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 Introduction1
Global Governance in the absence of a world state, based upon the self-imposed 
compliance with rules, implying global regulatory and (re-)distributive mecha-
nisms, is nearly unimaginable in today’s world without the participation of pri-
vate sector actors (Brühl/Rittberger 2001: 20). In many issue areas of interna-
tional relations, global governance already is a multipartite process in which, 
apart from governmental and intergovernmental actors (i.e. public actors), private 
actors from civil society and the business community ((I)NGOs and transnational 
corporations) participate. Although the intensity of public-private cooperation 
and the extent to which private actors are involved in processes of setting global 
norms and rules and of their implementation vary from issue area to issue area, 
the fact that private actors today play an important role in generating and moni-
toring a large number of global norms and rules, and in monitoring the compli-
ance of their addressees with them, cannot be overlooked.  
This paper consists of four parts, in which I shall present and discuss the follow-
ing four propositions concerning the above indicated developments: 
1. A trend from institutions of ‘exclusive’ executive multilateralism towards 
inclusive, multipartite institutions of global governance can be observed. 
2. This trend towards more inclusive institutions of global governance can be 
captured and analyzed in macro- as well as mesotheoretical terms. 
3. These inclusive institutions have the potential to close governance gaps 
inherent in global governance based on executive multilateral institutions.  
4. Inclusive, multipartite institutions of global governance are part of the de-
velopment towards a ‘heterarchical’ world order, which is less susceptible 
to violent conflict. 
 
 
1 The Trend From Executive Multilateralism Towards Inclusive, Multi-
partite Institutions of Global Governance 
The term 'governance' can be defined – independent of the level on which it takes 
place – as collective action which claims authority and is aimed at dealing with, 
and in the best case solving, common problems. More precisely: Governance 
refers to identifying promising and sustainable approaches to solve societal prob-
lems, translating these solutions into rules of conduct, ensuring adherence to 
                                                 
1 This publication is based on a paper prepared by the author for the 49th Annual Meeting of the Interna-
tional Studies Association in March 2008. For their valuable assistance while preparing this paper, the 
author is indebted to Ingvild Bode, Julia Ellinger, Andreas Kruck, Stefan Schäfer, Hanna Scheck, Alek-
sandra Stojkovski, and Patrick Theiner. 
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 these rules and, where necessary, adjusting these rules to changing conditions 
and circumstances (Rittberger et al. 2008: 46; Rittberger 2004: 247-249).  
In the era of globalization, the states' autonomous capacity to fulfill governance 
functions on the global level has been challenged by two major developments 
(see also section 2.1. in this paper). First, the increase in, and the intensification 
of, transsovereign problems potentially affecting all political communities re-
quire the cooperation of all actors concerned with these problems. Second, non-
state actors from the business sector and from civil society are more and more 
affected by the consequences of these transsovereign problems and have thus 
become increasingly important as rule makers and ‘teachers of norms’ (Rittber-
ger et al. 2008: 13). Cooperation between public and private actors aimed at deal-
ing with transsovereign problems and supplying global public goods is thus in-
creasing. This intensification of public-private cooperation is leading to institu-
tional change in the realm of global governance. Therefore, the spectrum of insti-
tutional arrangements is no longer adequately captured by the concept of inter-
governmental executive multilateralism. Rather, a trend from ‘exclusive’ execu-
tive multilateralism in intergovernmental organizations towards opening a space 
for non-state actors is leading ultimately towards an ‘inclusive’ institutionaliza-
tion of global regulatory or (re-)distributive policy-making. Inclusive, multipar-
tite institutions of global governance are characterized by providing not only 
public (state and/or inter-state) actors, but also private actors from the business 
sector and/or actors from civil society with the possibility of membership and by 
endowing them with formal participation, decision-making and voting rights in 
the policy-making process. 
As a result of the increasing inclusion of non-state actors in international institu-
tions and the resulting institutional change in the realm of global governance, 
three specific (inter-)organizational structures can be identified in the interna-
tional system (see Table 1 and Figure 1). It should be noted that these organiza-
tional structures developed at different points in time, but not necessarily in a 
linear manner. 
First: In a large number of international organizations ‘exclusive’ executive mul-
tilateralism has been and still is the dominant organizational structure. This ‘ex-
clusive’ organizational structure is characterized by non-public negotiations and 
bargaining between national government representatives, which are consciously 
isolated from public scrutiny or participation. Access to these decision-making 
processes for non-state actors is only of an informal nature, if it exists at all. Ex-
amples of this ‘exclusive’ executive multilateralism are the UN-Security Council, 
which provides ad-hoc access for non-state actors through the so called 'Arria-







































Table 1: Forms of Horizontally Coordinated Global Governance 
 
Second: Alongside this ‘exclusive’ executive multilateralism, a new feature of 
intergovernmental organizations has emerged which can be described as ‘open’ 
or ‘advanced’ executive multilateralism. This organizational feature derives from 
the charter of the international organization granting non-state actors formal ac-
cess to deliberative and decision-making bodies. Some international organiza-
tions have – as is the case with the UN Economic and Social Council by granting 
(I)NGOs formal consultative status – opened up towards non-state actors and 
provided them with the opportunity to voice their concerns within, and offer their 
expertise to, the intergovernmental organs of the organization (Martens 2005: 
155f; Staisch 2003; Alger 2002). Nonetheless, states still remain the central ac-
tors and gate-keepers, since they decide which non-state actors are granted for-
mal access to the international organization or organ, and under which condi-
tions. 
Third: Recently, the emergence of a ‘new’ mode of governance beyond the na-
tion state can be observed: the emergence and rise of global inclusive institutions 
in which public as well as private actors are endowed with membership and par-
ticipatory rights. In this (inter-)organizational structure, non-state actors are 
granted formal participation, decision-making and voting rights in the policy-
making process that by far exceed those granted to non-state actors endowed 
with consultative status in institutions of ‘open’ or ‘advanced’ executive multi-
lateralism. 
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Figure 1: Continuum of Institutional Forms of Horizontally Coordinated Governance 
 
The structure and mode of operation of inclusive global institutions can be illus-
trated by taking the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(Global Fund) as an example (Huckel Schneider 2007; Edele 2006). The Global 
Fund is being used as a governance instrument aimed at expanding the resources 
available worldwide for fighting certain infectious diseases and channeling re-
sources to those regions or locations most in need. After the decision to create the 
Global Fund was made by the UN General Assembly in June 2001, it took up 
work in the beginning of 2002. As a joint endeavor of the international commu-
nity, civil society, the private sector and those affected by the diseases, the 
Global Fund is based upon the participation of a large variety of actors affected 
by the problem and by the rule-making and distributive decisions reached for 
dealing with it. The highest organ of the Global Fund, the Foundation Board, is 
composed of representatives of developing and donor countries, (I)NGOs and 
businesses as well as representatives of international organizations (UNAIDS, 
WHO, World Bank Group). While all groups of actors participate in the debates 
and the drafting of documents, only the states together with (I)NGOs and busi-
ness actors are endowed with voting rights. 
Inclusive, multipartite institutions of global governance like the Global Fund are 
no longer an exception to the rule, but can be said to be part of a relatively new 
trend towards public-private partnerships for global governance in different issue 
areas of world politics: in this instance, in the issue area of global public health. 
Tendencies towards global inclusive institutionalization of transsovereign prob-
lem-management or -solving can be observed more broadly using empirical ex-
amples from all three policy domains of international politics (‘welfare’, ‘secu-
rity’, ‘system of rule’), albeit to a differing extent. 
As regards the policy domain of ‘welfare’ the following institutions can be 
pointed out: The Global Fund; UNAIDS; the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization (GAVI); or the widely known Global Compact, which aims at 
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 making private business actors comply with certain human rights, ecological, 
labor and social standards as well as with issuing ’communication(s) on pro-
gress’, i.e. reports on how these commitments are implemented. 
In the policy domain of ‘system of rule’ the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues (UNPFII) can be referred to as an example of inclusiveness, directed to-
wards issues concerning the rights and welfare of indigenous peoples (Thies 
2008; Ströbele-Gregor 2004: 23; García-Alix 2003). Also, the Voluntary Princi-
ples on Security and Human Rights is an initiative in which states (USA, UK, 
Netherlands, Norway) as well as (I)NGOs and transnational corporations from 
the extractive industries’ sector are represented. It is aimed at monitoring and 
supporting the compliance with human rights standards especially in those areas 
in which the participating corporations are conducting business and in which, at 
the same time, states seemingly lack the capacity or the readiness to uphold the 
rule of law. 
Even in the sovereignty-sensitive policy domain of ‘security’, the Kimberley 
Process Certification Scheme (Kimberley-Process) for the certification of the 
origins of raw diamonds, the Chad Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project and the Ex-
tractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) serve as examples of inclusive 
institutions aimed at dealing with the cross-border effects of ‘conflict-economies’ 
(Paes 2005: 67ff; Rittberger 2004a: 26f). 
 
 
2 Explaining the Emergence and Rise of Inclusive, Multipartite Institu-
tions of Global Governance 
The emergence and rise of inclusive, multipartite institutions of global govern-
ance can be accounted for, at the macrotheoretical level, by referring to a change 
of the global systemic context and changing constellations of actors. Mesotheo-
retically it can be explained by referring to the interests of, and resources avail-
able to, politically potent actors on the global level. Systemic change and chang-
ing constellations of actors in world politics create a demand for inclusive institu-
tions of global governance. Explanatory attempts that treat the interests and pref-
erences of, and resources available to, different groups of actors as independent 
variables complement this systemic approach by adding an agency-centered per-
spective. 
 
2.1 Change of the Global Systemic Context and Changing Constellations of 
Actors 
Contemporary world politics is marked by fundamental processes of change usu-
ally described as globalization or denationalization. As a consequence of these 
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 processes, not only the problem-solving and regulatory or (re-)distributive ca-
pacities of individual states, but also those of the intergovernmental organizations 
set up by them prove to be deficient in the sense of permitting governance gaps 
to open and to spread (see section 3 on below). 
The demand for inclusive institutions of global governance can be traced to two 
major developments (Rittberger 2006: 46ff): First, globalization has led to the 
emergence of new transsovereign problems and at the same time to the aggrava-
tion of existing ones. Transsovereign problems like world-wide pandemics, 
global environmental threats or transnational terrorism dominate the global po-
litical agenda after the Cold War (Cusimano 2000: 3). They do not only exceed 
the problem-solving and regulatory or (re-)distributive capacities of individual 
states, but also those of international intergovernmental organizations, mainly 
because those responsible for the problem as well as those addressed by the rules 
aimed at dealing with the problem are themselves transnationally active private 
entities. Purely intergovernmental international organizations that follow the pat-
tern of executive multilateralism are not suited to deal effectively with complex, 
transsovereign problems emanating from the activities of private actors. There 
are recurring deficits concerning the ‘problem-solving effectiveness’ of these 
organizations.  
Second, input-legitimacy deficits deriving from a lack of participatory opportuni-
ties in international intergovernmental organizations can be made out: non-state 
actors are affected, in many ways, by decisions of these organizations, but they 
are usually not granted adequate participatory rights in these organizations’ pol-
icy-making processes. These input-legitimacy deficits of intergovernmental or-
ganizations take on an even more dramatic character when confronted with the 
widening of the spectrum of politically potent actors on the global level and the 
shifting power relations between them. The ‘new’ actors from civil society and 
the business sector may serve as adversaries or as cooperation partners in do-
mains formerly dominated by states or inter-state actors. The emergence of inclu-
sive institutions can be seen as a response to the question of how to develop and 
institutionalize new authority structures involving nation-states, international in-
tergovernmental organizations as well as the business and civil society sectors 
(Rittberger 2006: 46).  
 
2.2 Agency-centered Explanations 
The systemic-functionalist argument that inclusive institutions are created be-
cause they are expected to close existing governance gaps cannot fully account 
for the emergence of these institutions (Edele 2006:12; Benner/Reinicke/Witte 
2004: 193-195; Brühl/Liese 2004: 165). The demand for inclusive, multipartite 
institutions of global governance, which stems from governance gaps immanent 
in the system of executive multilateralism, does not automatically create a suffi-
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 cient supply of these institutions (Benner/Reinicke/Witte 2004: 195; Brühl 2003: 
167). In order to explain the emergence of specific inclusive institutions, an 
agency-centered analysis of the interests and preferences of, and the resources 
available to, public and private actors is necessary. The explanation in this paper 
will be based upon two major theoretical approaches: resource exchange theory 
and collective goods theory. 
 
 
Figure 2: Theoretical Approaches 
 
2.2.1 Resource Exchange Theory 
An explanation based on resource exchange theory and dealing with the emer-
gence of inclusive, multipartite institutions posits that these institutions are set up 
by public and private actors to ‘exchange’ or ‘pool’ their specific material and 
immaterial resources in order to manage a certain transsovereign problem. The 
emergence of multipartite modes of coordination and cooperation can then be 
explained by the motivation of rational actors, resulting from resource deficits, to 
exchange or pool their specific problem-relevant resources and thus be better off 
than they would be through unilateral or executive multilateral action (Edele 
2006: 49). 
From the vantage point of resource exchange theory, two conditions are crucial 
for the emergence of inclusive institutions of global governance. First, there ex-
ists a consensus between and among the various public and private actors that 
their goals in a given policy domain, and the strategies employed to reach these 
goals, are compatible, or, in the best case, even complementary. In other words: a 
so called ‘domain consensus’ is necessary. Second, mutual resource dependence 
between various public and private actors sharing this domain consensus is held 
to possess explanatory power for the emergence of inclusive institutions (Edele 
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 2006: 45f; Pfeffer/Salancik 1978): In order to effectively deal with transsover-
eign problems, institutions of global governance are in need of sufficient access 
to material, regulative, organizational and epistemic resources. Since the public 
and private actors referred to above, on their own, do not have all of these re-
sources at their disposal, they have to cooperate in order to effectively deal with 
transsovereign problems. If all (or at least most) of these actors take part in the 
policy programming and implementation process and share their resources, they 
can expect to effectively deal with transsovereign problems. The emergence of 
inclusive institutions can thus be conceived of as resulting from the exchange of 
material and immaterial resources between public and private actors: The major 
resources of business actors are financial means and management expertise. 
(I)NGOs, in turn, can contribute financial means as well as problem-specific 
knowledge, and public actors can offer participatory rights in decision-making 
processes of global governance institutions (Edele 2006: 46 f; Aldrich 1979: ch. 
11; Pfeffer/Salancik 1978: ch. 3). 
In a nutshell: According to resource exchange theory, inclusive, multipartite in-
stitutions of global governance emerge if and when, in a certain policy domain, 
public and private actors agree on common policy goals and on strategies to 
achieve them causing these various actors to be mutually dependent on each oth-
ers’ resources in order to reach compatible or even complementary goals. 
 
Resource Exchange Theory and the Case of the Global Fund 
Considering the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, a broad 
consensus can be identified concerning the problem of infectious diseases and the 
importance of the role played by non-state actors in fighting these diseases. The 
fundamental compatibility of the goals and activities of private actors with those 
of public actors has been acknowledged in recent years, especially on the part of 
public actors. Also, a strong case for resource interdependence between public 
and private actors can be made out in the case of the Global Fund: a strong de-
pendency of public actors on financial resources, management expertise and spe-
cific expert knowledge for designing and implementing effective measures in the 
fight against infectious diseases is matched by private actors’ strong dependency 
on the resource of full participation in public health decision-making on the 
global level. Transnational corporations have an interest in this resource because 
they expect benefits in terms of enhanced reputation and improved access to 
health markets; (I)NGOs are interested in fully participating in public health de-
cision-making because it will allow them to shape such policies with potentially 
global impact according to their preferences and values (Huckel Schneider 2007: 
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 2.2.2 Collective Goods Theory 
Whereas resource exchange theory explains the emergence of inclusive, multi-
partite institutions based on an analysis of the interests and resources of the  ac-
tors involved – i.e., it explains the demand for inclusive institutions –, collective 
goods theory offers insights into the make-up of an institution, i.e. it seeks to de-
termine which actors or groups of actors need to be part of the institution in order 
for it to be able to effectively and efficiently provide a collective good 2  (Theiner 
2007; Kölliker 2006). 
The availability of capabilities necessary to allow for an efficient provision of 
global public goods serves as the point of departure for the search for the actors 
needed  to participate in an institution of global governance that could provide 
these goods (Kölliker 2006: 208ff). The ‘externalities’, i.e. the positive as well as 
negative effects of the provision of such goods for outsiders, produce an ineffi-
cient resource allocation because supply of, and demand for, a collective good 
are not balanced. An institution that wants to efficiently produce a certain good 
has to avoid outsiders to bear the burden of these effects: in other words, it has to 
internalize both positive and negative externalities (Theiner 2007: 17). Only 
those institutions in which all actors affected by externalities are included will be 
capable of producing public goods efficiently. 
Externalities can be distinguished according to their territorial and functional 
reach: cross-border (territorial) externalities of the provision of a good are the 
effects on actors across borders; cross-sector (functional) externalities refer to 
effects on social groups – or on a society as a whole – who do not directly take 
part in the production or consumption of the good. The larger the cross-border 
and the cross-sector externalities are that accompany the production of a good, 
the greater are the efficiency problems that result from the good’s production 
(Theiner 2007: 18; Kölliker 2006: 209f). 
Participants or outsiders will exercise pressure to create a new, more efficient 
institution or to adapt the existing one with a view to reducing its efficiency 
problems (Theiner 2007: 17). However, this pressure does not necessarily lead to 
institutional adaptation or innovation as institutional inertia and contrarian inter-
ests of outsiders and members may work against adaptation or innovation. 
The functional and the territorial reach of externalities determine the design an 
institution needs to take on in order to efficiently provide collective goods. Col-
lective goods theory departs from the assumption that, in the first instance, goods 
are produced by private actors in a market environment. Their ability to provide 
                                                 
2 Collective goods theory commonly distinguishes between four kinds of goods: Private goods (rival and 
excludable in consumption), Common goods (rival but not excludable), Club goods (non-rival but ex-
cludable), and Public goods (non-rival and non-excludable) (cf. Kölliker 2006). Due to their characteris-
tics, public goods, in general, are not provided by private actors on a market and have thus come to be 
seen as states' responsibility (peace, security, stable financial system etc.). A discussion about global 
governance is thus mainly concerned with the provision of public goods on a global level. 
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 collective goods efficiently decreases to the extent to which cross-sector exter-
nalities increase, as coordination gets more difficult the more participants need to 
be coordinated. In the same manner, the ability of states to produce collective 
goods decreases inasmuch cross-border externalities increase, as they, too, make 
coordination more difficult (Theiner 2007: 18; Kölliker 2006: 206ff). 
Global inclusive institutions thus appear as an efficient solution for the provision 
of global public goods with large cross-border and cross-sector externalities as-
suming, as was pointed out above, that the production of a good is more efficient 
when more actor groups that are affected by the externalities of the good are in-
cluded in the good’s provision. In other words: the larger the cross-sector exter-
nalities of a good, the more public as well as private actors need to be included in 
order to secure the efficiency of the good’s provision (Kaul/Conceicao 2006). 
Similarly, the larger the cross-border externalities of a good, the higher the level 
beyond the individual state at which the efficient provision of the good is likely 
to be achieved. In addition, an institution can produce a good effectively only 
when internal problems of collective action among the members of the institution 
are solved. The bigger these internal problems concerning the good’s provision 
are, the more are private producers of collective goods dependent on the partici-
pation of public actors who are capable of using state authority in order to solve 
such problems of collective action. 
 
Collective Goods Theory and the Emergence of Inclusive Institutions in the 
Issue area of ‘Internet Governance’ 
The attempts to control and regulate the uses of the internet (internet governance) 
can illustrate the contribution of collective goods theory to explaining the emer-
gence of inclusive, multipartite institutions of global governance. As far as the 
status of the internet as a ‘good’ can be ascertained, its properties are those of a 
global public good3 with large cross-sector and cross-border externalities 
(Theiner 2007: 61). The uses of the internet are – with certain qualifications – of 
a non-rival nature, and nobody can easily be excluded from them. They do not 
only exert significant influence on other parts of society, but also across borders. 
An effective and efficient regulation of the internet can thus only be achieved by 
transnational institutions with a high degree of inclusiveness (Theiner 2007: 61). 
It is noteworthy, however, that a large number of non-inclusive institutions from 
the private as well as from the public sector attempt to control and regulate parts 
of the internet. These institutions can only insufficiently deal with the multitude 
                                                 
3  The internet’s status as a whole is currently being debated (Theiner 2007: 52ff). Parts of the internet are 
of a rival nature (e.g. domain names and IP-addresses). Also, Chinese censoring of specific internet sites, 
or more precisely: the restriction of inner-Chinese connection attempts to specific internet sites, can raise 
doubts about the non-exclusiveness of the good ‘internet’. Nonetheless, the larger ‘part’ of the internet 
can be said to be of a non-rival nature. Basically, no one with the necessary equipment can be excluded 
from using the internet. The (Chinese) filtering of the internet is insufficient and can be avoided relatively 
easily. All in all, the internet can be seen, with few qualifications, as a global public good. 
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 of problematic aspects of the internet (reaching from infrastructural problems of 
connectivity to the costly burden of spam and the danger of cybercrime). The 
assumptions of collective goods theory are thus proven valid: if existing institu-
tions do not enjoy broad enough support from different groups of actors for the 
provision of the required goods – i.e. if they are not sufficiently inclusive – con-
trol and regulation of the internet cannot be efficient and effective (Theiner 2007: 
85f). 
As mentioned before, pressure to create more effective and efficient institutions 
of governance is prompted by pertinent shortcomings of the provision of goods. 
And indeed, in the realm of internet governance a trend towards inclusive, multi-
partite institutions can be observed more recently, which is expected to lead to 
better results in regulating the internet. Examples for this trend are the two World 
Summits on the Information Society (WSIS 2003 and 2005), a Working Group on 
Internet Governance (WGIG) created after WSIS 2003 as well as the Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF) established in 2006. Only highly inclusive institutional 
settings like WSIS, WGIG and especially the IGF are capable of providing ade-
quate regulatory mechanisms for the internet as a whole, as opposed to merely 
covering fragmented technical aspects of internet governance (Theiner 2007: 
89f). These cases of institutional innovation indicate the emergence of an institu-
tional form which acknowledges the necessity to include a wide array of actors in 
order to reach an adequate (i.e. efficient and effective) regulation of the uses of 
the internet. In the case of the internet, a transition of global governance ar-
rangements from, by and large, exclusively private institutions like the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in the realm of domain 
names allocation via the co-existence of private and public institutions (e.g. in 
the fight against spam) to the cooperation of public and private actors has oc-
curred. The development in the issue area of regulating the uses of the internet 
thus marks a shift in global governance which proceeded in the opposite direc-
tion to the inclusion of private actors in institutions formerly dominated by public 
actors (Rittberger et al. 2008; Theiner 2007: 90f). 
 
 
3 The Potential of Inclusive, Multipartite Institutions to Close Global 
Governance Gaps  
After having traced the trend from ‘exclusive’ executive multilateralism to inclu-
sive, multipartite institutions of global governance and having examined the 
causes and conditions of the emergence and rise of these institutions, the question 
of “does it matter?” arises, i.e. whether this new type of institution is contributing 
to solving or mitigating two core problems of global governance: Are inclusive 
institutions capable of closing output-related governance gaps? And: can inclu-
sive institutions contribute to reducing the participatory deficit of global govern-
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 ance (Woods 2007; Coicaud 2007; Zweifel 2006: 14-18; Keohane and Nye 2003; 
Nye 2001); is there a potential to close input-related governance gaps? 
In the following, the analysis will concentrate on the effects on global govern-
ance stemming from the trend towards inclusive, multipartite institutions in dif-
ferent issue areas of international relations. ‘Inclusiveness’ will thus be treated as 
the independent variable. 
In dealing with transsovereign problems four governance gaps can be distin-
guished (Kaul et al. 1999: xxvi-xxxiv; Brühl/Rittberger 2001: 21-23; see also 
Figure 3): 
The incongruence between the reach of societal exchanges and transactions and 
of the transsovereign problems emanating from them, on the one hand, and the 
reach of political regulations, on the other, brings about, first, a ‘jurisdictional 
gap’. This mismatch between the cross-border nature of transsovereign problems 
and the often spatial and actor-specific limitations of problem-solving capacities 
of states and their intergovernmental organizations leads to a lack of effective 
and legitimate problem management and of its rules-based institutionalization. 
Second, the implementation of global policy programs often falls short of agreed-
upon goals. This ‘operational gap’ shows up in many policy domains where gov-
erning institutions on the level of individual states and even on the inter-state 
level lack the scientific-technical knowledge and expertise as well as the politi-
cal-administrative capacities needed to deal effectively with transsovereign prob-
lems. 
Third, an ‘incentive gap’ can be identified. The incentive gap leads to insufficient 
compliance with inter- or transnational norms and rules. On the global level, 
there usually exist only limited means to create external incentives for the obser-
vance of obligations. 
Finally, a ‘participatory gap’ can be made out. The participatory gap opens up 
because access for those affected by the problem, and by the rules created for 
dealing with it, to policy-relevant deliberations and decision-making processes in 
intergovernmental organizations of the executive-multilateral type is not avail-
able or heavily restricted. 
The existence of these governance gaps demonstrates that global governance based 
on institutions of executive multilateralism cannot fulfill important tasks of govern-
ance and thus raise questions about the legitimacy of global governance. Basically, 
two kinds of legitimacy can be distinguished: ‘Input’ or ‘process legitimacy’, deriv-
ing from the extent and depth of participatory opportunities as well as from the 
transparency and fairness of policy-making processes, and ‘output legitimacy’, re-
ferring to the performance of political-administrative systems or of institutions of 
global governance as regards the effective dealing with (transsovereign) problems 
they are facing. 
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  Figure 3: Governance Gaps and Dimensions of Legitimacy 
 
‘Input’ or ‘process legitimacy’ is called into question on the global level when 
participatory gaps arise. These gaps result from delegating political competencies 
to the global level and from restricted access for the general public to, as well as 
the lack of transparency of, authoritative decision-making processes on the global 
level. The ‘output legitimacy’ of global governance is put at risk by the three 
other governance gaps mentioned before: the jurisdictional gap, the operational 
gap, and the incentive gap. Altogether, ‘output legitimacy’ thus primarily refers 
to the effectiveness of institutions in generating and implementing their policy 
programs with a view to dealing effectively with problems that confront them 
(Scharpf 1999). 
In the following, it will be argued that inclusive, multipartite institutions of 
global governance have the potential to close the above mentioned governance 
gaps on the global level and thus to contribute to reducing the deficits of ‘input’ 
or ‘process’ as well as of ‘output legitimacy’ inherent in global governance insti-
tutionalized in the form of executive multilateralism (Rittberger et al 2008; 
Rittberger 2006). 
Inclusive Institutions contribute to increasing ‘input’ or ‘process legitimacy’ of 
global governance by allowing for greater participation on the global level by 
those affected by transsovereign problems and/or by the norms and rules aimed 
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 at solving or mitigating them and thus securing a greater sharing of responsibility 
between public and private actors. According to the tenets of representative de-
mocracy, the inclusion of the above mentioned groups (‘stakeholders’) in the de-
cision-making processes of governing institutions increases the legitimacy of 
global governance since every form of democratic rule is based upon the partici-
pation of (and thus acceptance by) the norm and rule addressees (Scholte 2002: 
285). 
Inclusive, multipartite institutions of global governance such as UNAIDS and the 
Global Fund can be cited as examples for a closure of the participatory gap inas-
much they empower not only states and several UN-institutions, but also 
(I)NGOs, private business actors, and even representatives of those affected by 
the diseases with formal rights of participation in policy-making. 
Skeptics argue that inclusive institutions of global governance can only be as le-
gitimate as the actors themselves who take part in the institution are, and that 
non-state actors, in particular, often lack legitimacy from within and without 
(Benner/Reinicke/Witte 2004: 200). However, from the theoretical perspective of 
pluralism it can be argued that the inclusion of a multitude of non-state actors, 
representing a wide variety of interests, beliefs and values, is a positive and vi-
able approach toward closing participatory gaps on the global level. The inclu-
sion of actors from civil society and the business sector increases the quantity 
and quality of interests, belief systems and values represented in the policy-
making process and thus reduces the participatory (or ‘voice’) gap, even if the 
private actors taking part in this process do not always live up to standards of 
democratic legitimacy themselves. 
The inclusion of actors from civil society and the business sector also positively 
impacts on the effectiveness of an institution because it leads to an increased 
readiness to comply with norms and rules. Governance structures and processes 
which are accorded high ‘input’ or ‘process legitimacy’ by the norm addressees 
can usually expect a higher degree of norm compliance by its norm addressees 
(Zürn 2005; Franck 1997: 355; Tallberg 2002). This points to a mutual influence 
between ‘input’ or ‘process legitimacy’ and ‘output legitimacy’: Actors who 
were themselves involved in the creation of the norms and rules concerning 
them, and have thus added to their legitimacy, are more likely to comply with 
these norms and rules created with their participation. 
The inclusion of multiple actor groups also contributes to the closure of opera-
tional gaps of global governance by increasing the possibility of obtaining useful 
and precise information for problem identification and diagnosis as well as for 
adequate policy implementation and the monitoring of norm compliance. Non-
state actors can add their capabilities for norm generation and implementation 
where the resources of state or inter-state actors do not suffice. In this manner 
non-state actors can contribute their knowledge and expertise, which state actors 
may lack in specific issue areas, to governance processes and, in addition, con-
tribute to rule and norm generation in their function as norm entrepreneurs as 
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 well as influence decision making processes according to their specific interests, 
beliefs and values (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998; Finnemore 1993). Last but not 
least, private actors can contribute to fulfilling governance tasks by providing 
material resources. 
Finally, the implementation of norms and rules can be followed through more 
effectively by improved monitoring made possible by the participation of trans-
national civil society actors. These actors often are in a better position to monitor 
and assess developments internal to states than (external) state actors who are, in 
the face of the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention, limited in 
their options. With the inclusion of non-state actors, the probability that the vio-
lation of norms by state actors remains unnoticed and that their violating of 
norms goes unsanctioned can be reduced, and thus the incentive gap significantly 
diminished (Zangl/ Zürn 2003: 166; Keck/ Sikkink 1998). 
 
 
4 The Emergence of a Heterarchical World Order with a Reduced Propen-
sity for Violent Conflict 
The creation of inclusive, multipartite institutions of global governance is a con-
stitutive element of an emergent heterarchical world order. This heterarchical 
world order is marked by the co-existence of states; intergovernmental, interna-
tional organizations; inclusive, multipartite institutions and private governance 
institutions aimed at managing transsovereign problems. This co-existence of 
different institutional forms of global governance does not imply that state and 
inter-state institutions necessarily lose importance. Rather, they are integral ele-
ments of a network of differently constituted institutions of global governance. 
 
Forms of Global 
Governance 
















Principle Hierarchy Anarchy 
(regulated) 
Anarchy Heterarchy 
Table 2: Ordering Principles of Global Governance 
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 4.1 Heterarchy as an Emergent World Order 
The term ‘heterarchy’ denotes a ‘third’ ordering principle between anarchy and 
hierarchy. It points to an alternative to mere anarchic self-help systems, on the 
one hand, and formally or de facto hierarchically structured systems, i.e. a world 
state or hegemonic or even imperial rule, on the other (Holsti 1992: 56f). The 
concept of heterarchy is meant to describe the existence of an increasingly dense 
network of institutions of global governance, created and maintained by public 
and private actors, and aimed at the rules-based collective management of 
transsovereign problems through horizontal policy coordination and cooperation 
where different  groups of actors (states, intergovernmental organizations, civil 
society organizations, transnational corporations/ private sector actors) are sensi-
tive to each other’s values and interests and dependent on one another to achieve 
collective goals. 
The peculiarities of a heterarchical world order consist, inter alia, in the horizon-
tal generation and implementation of norms and rules – which is not bound to a 
vertical, top-down policy process. Instead, its institutional framework is flexible 
enough to allow for a range of innovative institutional approaches toward dealing 
with transsovereign problems of a varying nature. Thus, different problem-
solving processes are designed and activated according to situational needs in a 
given issue area. 
A heterarchical order is based on the activities and problem-solving capacities of 
a variety of public and private actors and utilizes their respective resource en-
dowments. Leadership is exercised by those actors who are, or are perceived to 
be, best suited to deal with a certain issue. Formally, the different actors are 
largely independent from one another, but find themselves within a system of 
complex interdependence. Concomitant to the rise of transsovereign problems, 
this mutual dependency promotes the creation of institutionalized policy coordi-
nation and cooperation between public and private actors.  
The emergent heterarchical world order signifies that global governance is possi-
ble in the absence of a world state or hegemonic or imperial power through hori-
zontal reciprocal commitments to rules-based problem management and monitor-
ing of compliance. State, inter-state and non-state actors are increasingly aware 
of the necessity and utility of rules-based multipartite policy coordination and 
cooperation in order to effectively and legitimately manage transsovereign prob-
lems. 
 
4.2 Lower Propensity of the Heterarchical World Order for Violent Con-
flicts 
The emergence of a heterarchical world order (apparently) coincides with a de-
creasing number of violent conflicts. Publications like the Human Security Re-
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 port 2005 (Human Security Centre 2005) or the Human Security Brief 2006 
(Human Security Centre 2006) impressively demonstrate that many forms of vio-
lent conflict have significantly decreased in number since the end of the Cold 
War. Inter-state wars have become rare making up only 2% of all armed con-
flicts. Even more importantly, the quantity of intra-state conflicts, the dominant 
mode of armed conflict today, has decreased significantly since the 1990s. In the 
years between 2002 and 2005, the number of intra-state wars declined by 26%, a 
development which is mostly due to trends of violent conflict in sub-Saharan Af-
rica (Mack 2007: 6). 
In some parts of the world, these trends are even more manifest. Western Europe, 
formerly the main stage for the most violent inter-state conflicts, has shown a 
remarkable degree of social and political de-militarization. James Sheehan 
(2008) refers to this development as the ‘Civilizing of Europe’: general conscrip-
tion, for instance, was abandoned in European countries like France, Italy, Spain 
and the UK before and at the beginning of the 21st century. North and South 
America exhibit a relatively low propensity for violent conflict as well. Espe-
cially in the case of South America, a dramatic decrease of political violence 
since the 1990s can be observed (Human Security Centre 2005: 24-25). 
How can this significant decrease of political violence be explained? Andrew 
Mack employs a threefold explanation: The end of the colonial era and of the 
Cold War removed two structural sources of political conflict. Additionally, an 
increased international activism can be observed, especially reflected in peace 
missions led by the United Nations and regional international organizations. The 
number of UN preventive or peacebuilding missions has increased from one in 
the year 1990 to six in the year 2002, and UN-peacekeeping operations have in-
creased by a factor of four – from four in 1990 to 15 in 2002 (Mack 2007: 1-6). 
In the following, it is argued that another factor favoring this development can be 
found in the emergence of a heterarchical world order. Direct and indirect effects 
of the emergent heterarchical world order on the propensity for violent conflict 
are stipulated. The supposed direct effect of heterarchy refers to the higher de-
gree of interdependence and institutionalization between different groups of pub-
lic and private actors. A potential indirect effect is attributed to the increased ef-
fectiveness and legitimacy of multipartite global governance with regard to man-
aging transsovereign problems, which in turn leads to greater control and mitiga-
tion of causes of conflict. While the empirical validity of these arguments is cer-
tainly subject to further empirical testing, in the following, both tentative causal 
pathways, direct and indirect, will be laid out in greater detail. 
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  Figure 4: Heterarchy and the Reduced Propensity for Violent Conflict 
 
4.2.1 Direct Effects – Interdependence and Institutionalization 
In stark contrast to the violence-prone competition for security inherent in an an-
archical state system, a heterarchical world order is characterized by rules-based, 
multipartite policy coordination and cooperation. The sustained interaction be-
tween public and private actors, resulting in the creation of inclusive, multipartite 
institutions of global governance, leads to increased mutual dependency in all 
policy domains of global politics: welfare, system of rule, and security. First of 
all, this institutional inclusion creates a situation of ‘checks and balances’, in 
which global regulatory and (re-)distributive processes are being supported by a 
multitude of actors who exert mutual control over each other and thus balance 
each others’ policy-shaping potentials. More significantly, the inclusion of pri-
vate actors, from whom violent conflict directly or indirectly (such as in the case 
of extractive industries) often emanates, and the resulting possibilities for partici-
pation in policy-making processes, can lead to a direct reduction of the potential 
for violent conflict. It is well established that inter-state interdependencies are 
structural conditions discouraging inter-state violence and favoring cooperation. 
Extending this argument, increased mutual dependency and intensified institu-
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 tionalized interactions between public and private actors can be expected to cre-
ate incentives for multipartite cooperation, non-violent settlement of disputes and 
conflict prevention. Thus, one can expect the greater networking of public and 
private actors within heterarchy to make violent conflict between those actors 
more cost intensive and, as a result, less likely. 
 
4.2.2 Indirect Effects – Approaching Transsovereign Problems 
An indirect effect of the emergent heterarchical world order on a reduced pro-
pensity for violent conflict lies in its more effective and legitimate management 
of transsovereign problems. From this point of view, the dense network of differ-
ent (inclusive) institutional forms of global governance is an important prerequi-
site for a more reliable worldwide ‘peace order’. After all, transsovereign prob-
lems can only be successfully dealt with by including all ‘problem producers’, 
i.e. also non-state actors (Müller 2008: 31). As described above, inclusive institu-
tions can reduce the operative and the participatory gap of global governance and 
contribute to more effective and legitimate institutional responses to dealing with 
transsovereign problems. Many transsovereign problems even from policy do-
mains other than security, e.g. world wide pandemics or global climate change, 
also possess high conflict potential. If these transsovereign problems can be ef-
fectively dealt with through inclusive, multipartite institutions of global govern-
ance, the conflict potential emerging from them will be diminished with the re-
sult of a reduced propensity for violent conflict. Obviously, the impact of better 
management of transsovereign problems through inclusive, multipartite institu-
tions plays out most overtly in the policy domain of ‘security’. In this policy do-
main, the rollback of ‘war economies’ through multipartite institutions serves as 
an example for more effective management of violence-prone transsovereign 
problems. For instance, the inclusive, multipartite Kimberley Process Certifica-
tion Scheme is designed to ensure that raw diamonds offered on the world market 
will not generate any profits used for the financing of (intra-state) wars or trans-
national terrorism. Created through the joint efforts of governments, representa-
tives of the diamond industry and (I)NGOs in the South-African city of Kimber-
ley, the certification scheme is officially at work since 2003 (Kantz 2007). A first 
report of the monitoring mechanism(s) indicates a relatively high effectiveness. 
Monitoring in countries from which ‘conflict diamonds’ traditionally originate, 
such as Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo, confirmed a sig-
nificant increase in the percentage of certified raw diamonds destined for export. 
Notwithstanding the ad-hoc and preliminary character of this evaluation, the 
Kimberley Process might be considered as an example of a successful certifying 
mechanism and could function as a model for other conflict goods (Böge et al. 
2006: 33). The joint effort of state and non-state actors seems to allow for more 
effective management of the transsovereign problem of ‘blood diamond’ traffic. 
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 As this example demonstrates, the emergent heterarchical world order might also 
contribute in an indirect manner to consolidating or even reinforcing the trend 
towards the reduction of violent conflicts. It would do so by (working towards) 
the creation of inclusive, multipartite institutions and the concomitant higher ef-
fectiveness and legitimacy of dealing with transsovereign problems.  
 
 
5  Conclusion 
Global systemic changes, most notably processes of globalization, have led to an 
increase in the number and to an intensification of transsovereign problems as 
well as a growing need for the provision of global public goods. Against the 
backdrop of the emergence or aggravation of transsovereign problems and the 
changing constellations of actors in the global system, a trend towards institu-
tionalized public-private cooperation within inclusive, multipartite institutions of 
global governance can be observed. This trend towards an increased inclusion of 
non-state actors from the business sector and/or civil society in global regulatory 
or (re-)distributive policy-making aimed at managing and solving transsovereign 
problems and providing global public goods can be explained by an agency-
centered analysis of the interests and preferences of, and the resources available 
to, public and private actors. For that purpose, two major agency-centered theo-
retical approaches have been introduced in this paper: resource exchange theory 
and collective goods theory.  
As claimed in this paper, inclusive, multipartite institutions of global governance 
have the potential to close (well known) governance gaps – i.e. deficits of ‘input’ 
or ‘process legitimacy’ as well as of ‘output legitimacy’ – emanating from global 
governance in the form of executive multilateralism. Further empirical analyses 
should provide more thorough insights into whether, or rather under what condi-
tions, institutionalized forms of public-private cooperation are able to transform 
their potential for increasing the ‘input’ or ‘process legitimacy’ as well as the 
‘output legitimacy’ of global governance into actual effective and legitimate pol-
icy outcomes.  
Moreover, in the present paper it has been observed that the emergence of a ‘het-
erarchical’ world order and the implied management of transsovereign problems 
through horizontal policy coordination and cooperation between public and pri-
vate actors coincide with a worldwide decrease in political violence. It has been 
hypothesized that a heterarchical world order marked by increased interdepend-
encies between public and private actors, increased institutional density and more 
effective and legitimate management of transsovereign problems through inclu-
sive, multipartite institutions might have direct and indirect effects leading to a 
reduced propensity for violent conflict. As a matter of course, further research is 
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 needed in order to empirically evaluate the validity of the stipulated effects and, 
if need be, refine the above arguments  
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